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Abstract 
Could groups ever be an understanding subject (an epistemic agent ascribed with understan-
ding) or should we keep our focus exclusively on the individuals that make up the group? The 
way this paper will shape an answer to this question is by starting from a case we are most 
willing to accept as group understanding, then mark out the crucial differences with an uncon-
vincing case, and, ultimately, explain why these differences matter. In order to concoct the 
cases, however, we need to elucidate what it means to be attributed with understanding and 
what makes up an epistemic agent. I shall argue that it is abilities, above all, that guide our 
attributions of understanding. While it is true that understanding must go beyond single acts, 
this is not going beyond as in going behind them (to private occurrences which are impossible 
to discern and don’t themselves contribute anything of value), but beyond as in considering 
what people could and would do: their discernable and valuable abilities. To conceptualize 
whom the abilities belong to, I will specify what it means to be an epistemic agent. I shall 
argue that it is being a successful target of the epistemic stance. The epistemic stance (heavily 
inspired by Dennett’s intentional stance) forms an instrumental abstraction by attributing epis-
temic properties (i.e., beliefs, epistemic aims, problem-solving tactics) to an entity to explain 
or predict its behavior. Macro-systematicity (a higher-level pattern which a theory can exploit) 
is what makes the epistemic stance’s abstraction an explanatory powerful one (regardless of 
how that macro-systematicity is realized) and emergence (the lack of a straightforward map-
ping-relation between the micro and the macro) is what makes its power unique to a particular 
level of explanation. To end, I suggest two kinds of mapping-relations and walk through the 
shift from reducibility to emergence. 
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Introduction 
The concept of ‘understanding’ has recently started to gain ground in epistemology and the 
philosophy of science. What has not received an equal amount of attention in this literature is 
how to conceptualise who understands.1 I would like to contribute to the explication of ‘un-
derstanding subject’. Traditionally, philosophers have taken for granted that a relevant entity 
ascribable with understanding must always be an individual human. Could other entities be 
worthy candidates for understanding-attributions, though? The question of this paper is 
whether groups could ever be ascribed with understanding. As such, the aim of this paper is 
to answer the following Research Question, which will be abbreviated to (RQ): 
(RQ): (i) What would make groups an understanding subject (an epistemic agent 
ascribed with understanding) and (ii) what should make us change the subject 
from a group’s member(s) to the group collectively? 
Before we shape an answer to (RQ), it is important that we first further specify what the ques-
tion means (in section 1). First, I will characterize what it means to understand. Here, we will 
keep our focus on a paradigmatic example of an understanding subject, namely an individual 
human expert, and consider what it is about this example that makes us ascribe or deny under-
standing. I will argue that it is abilities, above all, that guide our attributions. That groups can 
display abilities is uncontroversial enough, but whether it is appropriate to attribute those abil-
ities to an epistemic group agent is another question. To understand this question, I will go 
over the concept of epistemic agency and consider what it is about individual human experts 
that would have us ascribe them with such agency. Then we can see whether the same applies 
to groups or whether there are any worthwhile differences that would have us abstain from 
considering groups in a similar light.  
The way this paper will shape the answer to (RQ) is by starting from what we are most willing 
to accept as group understanding and work our way backwards. I concoct (in section 2) the 
two most extremes: (a) a conceptually poor case of collective understanding and (b) a concep-
tually powerful (even if practically implausible) case of collective understanding. We can then 
mark out what the crucial differences are between the two which make us change our mind 
and subject, as well as explain why these differences matter. I will argue (in section 3) that it 
is macro-systematicity (i.e., a higher level pattern which we can detect and which a theory can 
exploit) and, I will elaborate (in section 4) that is those which are emergent (i.e., where the 
higher level ‘pattern’ has no straightforward mapping-relation to lower level ‘patterns’) which 
would have us attribute groups, and not its members, with understanding. 
 
1. Characterizing Understanding & Epistemic Agency 
(RQ) is a question with no easy answer, but we can make a lot of headway by starting with a 
clear and useful conceptualization. For that purpose, we will be concocting the most concep-
tually powerful case of collective understanding and consider its relevant differences from the 
least powerful case. This does entail that the crucial difference between the powerful and the 
 
1 One exception is Toon (2015). 
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poor case of collective understanding should lie in the kind of collective subject and not in the 
quality of understanding. Ideally, we keep the latter constant, but to do so we need to be able 
to express what it is that is being held constant and what is being varied. We need to elucidate 
what makes us (1.1) attribute understanding and (1.2) consider the target entity as an epis-
temic agent.  
 
1.1. Understanding 
It is fair to say that understanding is a trait that we sometimes uncontroversially attribute to 
certain epistemic agents. But is there a systematic way to reveal what understanding-attribu-
tions are or should entail? Answering this question involves specifying what we find so phil-
osophically or epistemically valuable about understanding and thus necessary for its 
attribution, regardless of who it is attributed to or what it is about. What is it in those situations 
of uncontroversial attribution or dismissal that guides us in ascribing or denying understan-
ding? With inspiration drawn from Ryle (2000), I shall argue that understanding-attributions 
always boil down to the subject in question possessing a particular set of relevant abilities.  
Certainly, the most salient feature of understanding is the feeling or sense of understanding. 
While this sense may be interesting from a psychological perspective, it has rightly been crit-
icized (e.g., Trout, 2002) as an unsatisfying characterization for understanding as an epistemo-
logical concept. It is not difficult to think of examples of someone understanding something 
without having any accompanying feeling and even easier to think of examples where some-
one did experience that sense but was simply overconfident.  
The literature makes frequent references to understanding, involving ‘grasping’ (e.g., Kvan-
vig, 2003; Khalifa, 2013; Grimm, 2014), or ‘seeing’ (Zagzebski, 2001), but what is being 
grasped or seen and what that entails is something that varies depending on who uses the term, 
meaning it still requires spelling out before they characterize anything. Philosophical concep-
tions of understanding are invariably connected to the presence of mental states (be it as ex-
planatory concept or trait) and abilities (be it as trait or symptom). So, the two main lines of 
spelling out the trait of understanding are as (a) appropriate mental states, potentially with 
abilities as symptoms (e.g., Zagzebski, 2001; Van Camp, 2013; Wilkenfeld, 2013) or (b) ap-
propriate abilities2 (e.g., de Regt & Dieks, 2005; Ylikoski, 2009; Hills, 2015; Delarivière & 
Van Kerkhove, 2017). Siding with the latter, I will argue why considering abilities as a mere 
symptom of mental states would put the cart in front of the horse and create needless problems. 
The upshot is that it is not the mental states themselves that are empirically accessible or epi-
stemically valuable to us, so we both detect and judge mental states by the abilities, and not 
vice versa. Allow me to elaborate. 
If we characterize understanding through mental states, then the successes of an understanding 
subject will need to come from the appropriate mental occurrence, namely that subject con-
sidering something appropriate in their mind’s eye or other mind-organ (i.e., having the ap-
propriate mental state) and the abilities that the subject may display are merely the public 
 
2 Potentially with certain mental states as explanatory constructs, as we shall explore later with the Epistemic 
Stance. 
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effects of the appropriate private mental occurrences. This view fits with some of our everyday 
language about understanding and justifications for understanding (e.g., seeing how things fit 
together, pointing to gaps or flaws in a mental image). There are, however, a couple of prob-
lems: First, if understanding is characterized through the appropriate private occurrences, then 
the task of gauging another person’s understanding is not just difficult, it is impossible. We 
cannot look into anyone’s mind, private as it is. We have no idea whether Euclid actually 
understood geometry, for only Euclid himself knew what went on in the privacy of his own 
mind. So, either our attributions of understanding are vain exercises in metaphysics or attri-
butions of understanding are not really about these secret occurrences. The second problem is 
that there’s no clear way to decide which occurrences are appropriate by referring only to those 
occurrences themselves. What is the correct mental state to understand the irrationality of the 
square root of 2? This is not only hard to characterize, but the avenues in which we look to 
justify our choices are invariably motivated by the external affordances granted, not by the 
intrinsic value of the occurrence itself. Calling the occurrence in one’s mind’s eye ‘a proof’ 
would be vacuous if what is seen cannot be put to any public use (or worse yet, the wrong 
use). Conversely, if we found out that someone exhibiting extreme competence had mental 
states different from what we have hitherto characterized as appropriate, we would broaden 
the scope of appropriate mental states, not deny them with understanding. One way out of this 
problem would be to say that the right occurrences are those of which the public effects are 
certain appropriate abilities, a route taken by Wilkenfeld (2013),3 for instance. But then our 
understanding-attributions are decided by the abilities and not the occurrences which suppos-
edly lie behind them. We may as well put the horse in front of the carriage, where it can do its 
work unencumbered.  
One reason why it may still seem appealing to refer to private occurrences beyond a person’s 
acts is because it is possible for the same act to be performed with and without understanding, 
e.g., by sheer luck, by rote imitation, or by blind rule-following. This seems to imply that the 
difference-maker for understanding lies not in the act, but in something beyond it. But we may 
readily concede this without thereby having to withdraw into a secret world. The use of the 
plural in “abilities” is not incidental. Understanding involves more than just having a single 
ability appropriate to the object of understanding. I can easily memorize a correct response to 
a certain question (or even a few of them) without understanding what it is that I am saying. 
The problem with such a single-track disposition or ability is not that such an ability should 
be discredited, but that the scope of abilities is too narrow. Answering questions according to 
a set script may be something one can get away with in tests that happen to only involve the 
memorized questions (giving a misleadingly good impression), but this will quickly fail once 
tested for other appropriate abilities (e.g., correct courses after a setback, explain in different 
words, apply it in a practical circumstance, make an analogy, answer what-if-things-had-been 
different questions, etc). It is not the narrow success of memorization that is problematic, but 
the wide failing it entails that makes for a poor understanding. If we draw open the scope of 
understanding to include all the relevant abilities, then it becomes increasingly difficult to 
 
3 “[O]ne’s understanding x consists in large part of representing x in the right sort of way (...) I will contend that 
‘the right sort of way’ is best cashed out as a mental representation the possession of which enables certain 
abilities” (Wilkenfeld, 2013, p. 1002) 
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motivate why a subject displaying the wide range of relevant abilities would not merit an un-
derstanding-attribution. When we attribute people with understanding, we are not making un-
testable inferences to any secret phenomena which are forever out of our reach and judgement, 
but we are gauging the appropriate multi-track dispositions of an understanding subject. So, it 
is true that our understanding-attributions go beyond single acts, but this is not going beyond 
as in going behind them (to occurrences which are impossible to discern and don’t themselves 
contribute anything of value), but beyond as in considering what people could and would do, 
namely their abilities (which we can discern and value). We may, instrumentally, speak of 
mental states, but we do so on the basis of abilities, and not the other way around. Hence, it is 
the abilities that actually characterize understanding. As such, we can characterize understand-
ing in the following way: 
‘S understands X’ corresponds to ‘S possesses sufficient abilities appropriate to X.’ 
The concept of abilities could be further cashed out as multi-track dispositions, but to keep 
this paper specific in focus and down in length, we will not be cashing out abilities beyond 
this. Which abilities are ‘appropriate’ to understanding has a variety of candidates, depending 
on who you ask and what kind of understanding they are meant to capture, including: recog-
nizing qualitatively characteristic consequences (de Reg & Dieks, 2005), making counterfac-
tual inferences in the contexts of manipulation, prediction and explanation (Ylikoski, 2009), 
answering what-if-things-had-been-different questions (Grimm, 2014), evaluate explanations 
(Khalifa, 2013), relating knowledge to other knowledge (Van Camp, 2013), etc. I believe the 
scope of understanding to be quite wide (i.e., composed of, but not exhausted by any single 
set of candidates discussed in the literature) and contextually dependent on the many aims and 
values of the epistemic practice to which the understanding-attributions relate. Having char-
acterized understanding, even if roughly, we can further specify our initial question of this 
paper by replacing ‘understanding’ in (RQ) with ‘possessing the appropriate abilities’ in 
(RQ’): 
(RQ’): (i) What would make groups an understanding subject (an epistemic 
agent that possesses the appropriate abilities), and (ii) what should make us 
change the subject from a group’s member(s) to the group collectively? 
It becomes relevant to note that we nonetheless do allude to mental properties in our explana-
tions and descriptions of someone’s abilities. We talk about someone having an appropriate 
belief, intending to achieve a certain worthwhile epistemic aim and having a sound tactic to 
do so. Furthermore, these ascriptions can be tied together into one explanatory entity to which 
the understanding can be attributed. From the entity’s multi-track dispositions, we do not just 
note its abilities, but we discern that there is an epistemic agent to whom the abilities belong. 
This entails that a failure of collective understanding will either be due to a lack of abilities or 
a failure to attribute the abilities to an epistemic group agent.  
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1.2. Epistemic Agency  
What is it that warrants anyone (or anything) being an epistemic agent? My contention is that 
it is nothing more or less than being a successful target of what I call the epistemic stance. 
This approach to epistemic agency is heavily lifted from Dennett’s (1990, 2009) interpreta-
tionist conception of agents through the intentional stance. The intentional stance is a popular 
approach in the philosophy of mind. It has also been utilized successfully in social ontology 
by Tollefsen (2002, 2015) and List & Pettit (2006), although my account will depart from both 
of them at different stages of the paper. Here is a good summary of the intentional stance: 
Anything that is usefully and voluminously predictable from the intentional stance is, by 
definition, an intentional system. The intentional stance is the strategy of interpreting the 
behavior of an entity (person, animal, artifact, whatever) by treating it as if it were a rational 
agent who governed its ‘choice’ of ‘action’ by a ‘consideration’ of its ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires.’ 
(Dennett, 2009, p. 339) 
The intentional stance is an innate capacity (as opposed to an academic theory) to interpret an 
entity as being governed by beliefs, intentions, and rationality. The sole justification for con-
sidering an entity as an agent is the efficacy of the stance in predicting or explaining its be-
havior that way (regardless of how it is realized physically), so there’s no difference between 
a ‘real’ and an ‘as if’ agent, and no dividing line between the two (Dennett, 2009). It is a 
normative stance in that this interpretation depends on what the agent ought to do (rationally), 
and requires a holistic approach in that the success of the stance lies not in pairing up the 
components of the stance with particular behaviors, but in how well the agent-package predicts 
or explains the entity’s behaviors overall (Dennett, 1990).  
In the same line, an epistemic agent is nothing more or less than the successful target of the 
intentional stance, except with a focus on the epistemically relevant properties. To distinguish 
the two, I shall refer to the epistemic stance instead, but the difference with the intentional 
stance is not one of kind, but one of focus. The epistemic stance is the strategy of interpreting 
the behavior of an entity by treating it as if it were governed by beliefs (which are always 
epistemic), epistemic aims (i.e., the kind of results that an epistemic practice values), and ep-
istemic tactics (i.e., any serious systematic attempt to get closer to an epistemic result), as well 
as any other intentions that play a supporting role in the epistemic agency. Like the intentional 
stance, it is normative and the normative standards of an epistemic practice are brought to bear 
in the interpretation. What counts and what does not as epistemic will not always be neatly 
distinguishable. Keeping a room at a particular temperature is not an epistemic aim. Applying 
for funding or drinking tea to help with concentration is only on the very fringes of epistemic 
aims or tactics, whereas breaking down the problem into parts or writing down a mnemonic 
device to help navigate a search-space is properly epistemic. I shall assume that the reader and 
I share similar enough intuitions about what counts as proper epistemic and what does not at 
all, and leave the grey areas for what they are. Given the intuitive agreement of many thought-
experiments in epistemology, it seems that if the epistemic stance is not innate, then it is cer-
tainly deeply rooted.  
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The stance is a holistic and instrumental abstraction. It is instrumental in that the sole justifi-
cation for interpreting an entity as an epistemic agent is the explanatory and predictive success 
of that interpretation. If seeing an entity as governed by epistemic attributes (beliefs, epistemic 
aims, and tactics) has explanatory or predictive power, then, by definition, that entity is an 
epistemic agent. We can now further amend our (RQ’) by specifying that epistemic agenthood 
is warranted by being a successful target of the epistemic stance in (RQ’’):  
(RQ’’): (i) What would make groups, displaying the appropriate abilities, ever 
be a successful target of the epistemic stance, and (ii) what should make us 
change the subject (the relevant entity to be attributed with understanding) from 
a group’s member(s) to the group collectively? 
Both the concept of understanding and epistemic agency start from the multi-track dispositions 
of the entity in question. Furthermore, one tends to invite the other. It would be unlikely that 
an entity displaying a set of abilities does not allow for an explanatory story of beliefs, epis-
temic aims, and tactics accounting for its actions. And, conversely, it would be unlikely to find 
an entity with no appropriate abilities whatsoever, but where an interpretation of beliefs, epis-
temic aims, and tactics does, nonetheless, have explanatory value. That groups can display 
abilities is uncontroversial enough, but the question remains whether it is appropriate to attri-
bute those abilities to an epistemic group agent, and this question is now in an appropriate 
shape for us to answer it in the remainder of the paper.  
 
2. The Two Extremes 
We will now concoct the least and most conceptually powerful case of collective understand-
ing to use them in shaping our answer to (RQ).  
 
2.1. The Composite Class 
The two cases need to meet some requirements to ensure that we are not misled by the wrong 
kinds of differences between them. First, they both need to involve a collective of people in a 
way that they can be labelled as a “group” (in the broadest sense of the term), for the only 
potential candidates of collective understanding are, not surprisingly, collectives. Second, both 
need to be tested for their abilities (understanding) in the same way, so the difference lies with 
them, not their tests. For this, let’s assume they both get the same written exam. Let’s further-
more assume that this exam is set up with incredible care, such that many of the relevant abi-
lities (appropriate to the object of understanding) are tested for and that it would be difficult to 
cheat or take shortcuts (e.g., by memorizing a few answers to standard questions), meaning 
that the results of the exam are a good indicator of understanding. Last, the results of the can-
didates in both cases should be equally successful. What makes the least conceptually powerful 
group the least conceptually powerful should not be that it does not display the relevant abilities 
in any way, for then the attribution of collective understanding would fail simply because there 
is no understanding to be attributed, and not because it was not collective. So, our two candidate 
groups need to display, in some form or another, the same relevant abilities for understanding, 
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but have it come from entirely different kinds of groups. With all this in mind, I submit Com-
posite Class as the least conceptually powerful case:  
Composite Class: Arbitrarily chosen people (including experts and non-experts) are 
put in a class and given one exam to fill in. Each class-member in turn adds their 
own answers to the exam. 
What makes the Composite Class a ‘group’ is that the people chosen are strung together under 
the label (and roof) of a ‘class,’ and made to contribute to the same exam. So, what makes 
them a group is nothing more than being a literal composite of the individual members and 
their exam consists of nothing more than fragmented results, which are a literal composite of 
the individual answers—some of which are correct and some of which are not. While the 
Composite Class does satisfy the condition that abilities need to be present (some of the an-
swers being those of experts), we have strong reasons not to talk about understanding belon-
ging to the group, except as a shorthand to talk about (some of) its individuals. To employ the 
epistemic stance towards the group as a whole would be very difficult and most unrewarding. 
The class does not act like any epistemic agent we know, nor will its exam results even resem-
ble that of any epistemic agent. Seeing the class as a literal sum of several epistemic agents 
will explain the exam and/or predict future exams but trying to see the exam as the output of 
a single epistemic agent would inevitably fail because the exam is simply too fragmented to 
benefit from an extra epistemic stance fixated on the group as a whole. 
 
2.2. The Expert Planet 
For the most conceptually powerful case of a group understanding, I would like to draw heavy 
inspiration from a paradigmatic individual epistemic agent: a human expert on the topic at 
hand. With this, I do not wish to make the claim that a human expert (especially not any par-
ticular one) should be the ultimate and singular standard for what characterizes an under-
stander, but if I am secure in the claim that a typical human expert is a good example of one, 
then I can also say that any functionally equivalent entity would be an equally powerful ex-
ample of an understander. Gilbert’s (2013) does justice to this idea when she says a ‘group 
belief’ entails that the members ‘are jointly committed to believing that p as a body’ (p. 137), 
which requires them ‘to emulate, as far as possible, a body that believes p’ (p. 140). With this 
(and other reasons that will be explored soon) in mind, I submit the Expert Planet as the most 
conceptually powerful case of a group understander or a group epistemic agent:  
Expert Planet: Every citizen on the planet takes on the roles of a single neuron such 
that the planet is isomorphic to the brain (and relevant body parts) of an expert. The 
planet is presented with a vast version of the exam and fills it out with its enormous 
planet-hands. 
Some readers may recognize this case as similar to the China Brain (Block, 1978), except that 
the object of understanding is not Chinese, but any area of expertise covered by the exam. 
While there are a couple of other differences between the Expert Planet and the China Brain, 
none of them are intended to distinguish the two cases in kind. Instead they are small amend-
ments intended to help guide our intuitions more appropriately: I have changed the nation into 
Collective Understanding  
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a planet so that we are less focused on our intuitions about the individuals and politics of real 
nations. I have also added ‘and the relevant body parts.’ This is not just to account for the 
planet interacting with an oversized exam-paper, or to make it easier to picture the planet as 
a full-fledged entity, but also to take into account any possible cognitive roles the body 
might play in individual human cognition (see the debate on embodied cognition). To satisfy 
proponents of embedded and extended cognition, I am also willing to further amend the 
thought-experiment to include an oversized environment as it will not change anything about 
my argument. 
The Expert Planet was set up to be functionally equivalent to a paradigmatic individual expert 
even in its most fine-grained detail. This means that every kind of behavior or disposition 
(from which we discern the abilities, beliefs, epistemic intentions and tactics) will be equally 
present in the Expert Planet. The beliefs, epistemic intentions and tactics which we use to 
predict or explain its behavior will be of equal use in predicting or explaining that of the Expert 
Planet. And because the epistemic stance makes no dictates on implementation, it does not 
matter to the stance that the entity is comprised of individuals rather than neurons. In short, 
everything that made that expert fit for employing an epistemic stance can also be found in the 
Expert Planet and every reason we have to treat the individual expert as an epistemic agent 
would apply for the Expert Planet. Nonetheless, it is a highly implausible scenario to expect 
to occur. So implausible that one may conceivably question why any ramifications of such a 
thought-experiment should be relevant to us. The reason why is because if there is any kind of 
group that would constitute a powerful case of group-understanding at all, it would be a group 
that, as a whole, operates exactly, even in its most fine-grained detail, like an individual expert. 
One of Rupert’s (2011) objections to group cognitive states is that it is very unlikely that there 
is any fine-grained similarity between the functional profile of individuals and any existing 
groups. But the Expert Planet is set up so that it definitely does. This makes its ludicrousness 
a strength. If you are not swayed to attribute collective understanding even in such an ex-
tremely unlikely situation as the Expert Planet, then I am not sure why any other collective 
effort would. Nonetheless, it does bear mentioning that one of the arguments surrounding the 
China Brain thought-experiment is exactly whether it is a convincing case of understanding 
(be it collective or not). Block (1978) has famously argued against functionalism on the basis 
that it sounds ludicrous to attribute the Chinese nation with mental properties. However, I will 
say that (i) the scenario’s practical implausibility may contaminate what we think about its 
conceptual appropriateness (i.e., planets or nations tend not to behave even approximately like 
an individual expert—which is not the same as their being unsuited to be deemed one if they 
would) and (ii) attributing the Chinese Nation or Expert Planet with these properties is con-
sistent with our best explanation of individuals (functionalism about other minds and under-
standers) and it is not clear why Block’s unease with the idea should count for anything more 
destructive to functionalism than being a surprising entailment. At the very least, it shifts the 
burden of proof to the opposition. If one wants to insist on the Expert Planet being a case 
without any collective epistemic agency or understanding, one would need to clarify what the 
relevant difference is and why that difference is the one that matters. 
We now have two cases, both of which display the successes of understanding, where one 
would benefit from an epistemic stance (towards the group) while the other would not. Using 
these, we can reverse engineer what it is that makes employing the epistemic stance so fitting 
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to the one, but not the other, and, crucially, what the relevant differences are that make 
us change the subject from the members to the group. We can turn back to (RQ’’). Here it 
is again: 
(RQ’’): (i) What would make groups, displaying the appropriate abilities, ever 
be a successful target of the epistemic stance, and (ii) what should make us 
change the subject (the relevant entity to be attributed with understanding) from 
a group’s member(s) to the group collectively? 
We will answer the two sub-questions (RQ’’-i) and (RQ’’-ii) in section 3 and 4 respectively, 
by making use of our two extreme cases and noting their differences. If we have a good argu-
ment for what the subject-changing factors are in these extreme cases, we are in a better posi-
tion to consider more true to life intermediate cases. 
 
3. Macro-systematicity 
The question is not whether the disposition of a group would include any abilities (it is uncon-
troversial that groups can display abilities), but whether those dispositions (abilities included) 
reveal the group as an epistemic agent. What would make groups, displaying the appropriate 
abilities, a successful target of the epistemic stance which unites their dispositions as belonging 
to one epistemic agent? This is the first part of our research question and I shall argue 
that the answer to it is macro-systematicity (i.e., a higher-level pattern) and elaborate on what 
that entails. 
 
3.1. Bypassing Micro-Complexity with Macro-Systematicity 
The epistemic stance aims to predict or explain. Nothing would allow us to predict or explain 
happenings in the world more precisely than discerning and utilizing precise laws of nature 
(through what Dennett calls the physical stance). At a very small level, a micro level, there 
may be such laws that exploit patterns or systematicities with a high rate of precision. But 
what they would boast in precision, they lack in swiftness. Try predicting what an expert will 
do by taking stock of the entire network and signal strength of neurons in her brain and you 
will appreciate just how impossibly strenuous and time-consuming that would be (even if it 
were theoretically possible). We would find ourselves with a lack of time and competence to 
explain or predict her behavior through this level. Because the Expert Planet is isomorphic to 
just such an expert, we are faced with the same difficulty in predicting or explaining its be-
havior through the patterns of what its members are doing. In both, we can appreciate the 
desire to bypass this complexity in some way. But if we wish to bypass the overwhelming 
complexity from lower-level patterns, then we need an opportunity to do so. That opportunity 
is macro-systematicity. ‘Systematicity’ refers to a pattern which a theory can exploit and 
‘macro’ refers to the larger or higher level (relative to another level) where we find this pat-
tern—meaning that we can exploit such a pattern to explain or predict without needing to know 
any of the lower-level patterns that implement it. The success of the epistemic stance in pre-
dicting or explaining individuals entails that there is some systematicity which the stance can 
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exploit. Systematicity can come in various kinds. It can be exact or, as in the case of the epis-
temic stance, approximate. While it may not be as precise a predictor as the physical stance, 
we will see that it makes up in swiftness what it loses in precision.  
A pattern which a theory can exploit can be atomistic or holistic (Dennett, 1989; Tollefsen, 
2002). The attributions here are holistic, in that their success is to be judged not by how well 
we can explain or predict the entity’s particular behaviors as particular attributes, but instead 
by how well the whole package of attributions fare in explaining or predicting the entity’s 
many behaviors. If the epistemic stance were atomistic, then for every component of the stance 
there would be an appropriate corresponding behavior (e.g., a belief that p corresponding with 
a particular disposition, such as asserting that p). The story, however, is not quite that simple. 
Ascriptions depend on each other (e.g., how a belief that p manifests itself may depend on 
whether there is a belief that q), so it is only by looking at how well sets of ascriptions fare in 
accounting or predicting groups of behaviors that we can validate those ascriptions. So, the 
stance does not quite require a ‘pattern of behaviour’ (Pettit, 2015, p. 100), but a systematic-
ity—as evidenced by the continued success of the stance in predicting or explaining the en-
tity’s behavior. For instance, particular beliefs (e.g., that the earth is round) do not require 
pairing up with particular dispositions (e.g., asserting that the earth is round). It is the package 
of ascriptions that does the explaining or predicting of the multitude of behaviors.  
The ascriptions are holistic in another sense (as opposed to localist) as well: they are spread 
across their implementation. If the ascriptions were localist, then we could locate each com-
ponent of a theory in a component of the entity. However, property reductionism must stop 
somewhere. Brains may store beliefs, but it is unlikely that neurons do and certain that atoms 
do not. At some point, while decomposing entities into parts, we lose certain concepts because 
their implementation is spread or distributed across the entity we are decomposing. So, the 
particular attributions we interpret the epistemic agent to have do not need to correspond with 
physical subcomponents of that entity. Because these systematicities are macro (i.e., of a 
higher level), we do not need to know any of the lower-level patterns that implement them. 
The epistemic stance postulates a useful abstraction (the agent) with no dictates on how this 
must be implemented physically. Groups do not necessarily need to replicate detailed brain-
processes before they can be regarded as epistemic agents. Nor do they need to follow any 
particular joint intention (List & Pettit, 2011), shared plan (Bratman, 2013), we-mode 
(Tuomela, 2013), or joint commitment (Gilbert, 2013) to bring these macro-systematicities 
about, as long as they do—which may equally be accomplished by distributing the labor or 
sub-tasks involved (Hutchins, 1995; Bird, 2014).  
The two cases showcase this need for macro-systematicities in the extremes. The composite 
class does not display any macro-systematicity in the way we would expect from an epistemic 
agent. The exam, taken as a whole, is too fragmented. We might be able to predict or explain 
what is going on with individual members and aggregate these explanations to talk about the 
class, but no benefit is to be gained from seeing the class as one whole. The Expert Planet, on 
the other hand, does behave, as a whole, with macro-systematicity—namely with the same 
systematicity as the human expert that its brain (and body) is isomorphic to. Hence, the epis-
temic stance can exploit the same (relevant) macro-systematicities and the epistemic stance 
would have an equal explanatory and/or predictive power than it would have for an individual.  
Sven Delarivière 
 
 
12 
3.2. The Shorthand of Reducibility 
If macro-systematicities are what makes an epistemic stance successful, it should follow that 
there is nothing more to an epistemic agent than the appropriate macro-systematicities. How-
ever, there is one point we have not yet considered: the group-level systematicities are not 
necessarily discernible only at the level of the group. If we can give a complete causal expla-
nation couched in terms of cognitive states of individuals (along with physical structures), then 
we do not need to commit to a new kind of entity or state. This is Rupert’s (2011) Simplicity-
based Argument. Furthermore, if groups are realized by their members, what characterizes a 
group or its behavior is always determined by what its members are doing.  
In particular, no group agent can form propositional attitudes without these being deter-
mined, in one way or another, by certain contributions of its members, and no group agent 
can act without one or more of its members acting. (List & Pettit, 2011, p. 64) 
This is because the group supervenes on its members. Does not that entail that all group-talk 
is merely a shorthand to talk about its members? In other words, do group properties not reduce 
to member properties? In the case of individuals, it is easy to see why we do not reduce the 
epistemic properties (e.g., beliefs) of individuals to the epistemic properties of its parts, be-
cause the parts (e.g., neurons) do not invite being ascribed with such properties. But the parts 
of a group are individuals and individuals are appropriate candidates for epistemic properties. 
So conceptually it is possible for a group to be a successful target of the epistemic stance and 
have its epistemic properties reducible to the properties of its members. We can easily think 
of examples where the attributions we make to the group are mere shorthands, for instance 
when individuals share a purpose (e.g., ‘Our class has English at 9:30’), an attribute (e.g., ‘Our 
family isn’t particularly bright’) or even just a space (e.g., ‘Visitors need to leave the premises 
by 17:00’) and we group them according to this shared property. In all these claims we could 
easily swap the group-label (‘class,’ ‘this family,’ and ‘visitors’) with ‘the members of that 
group,’ because the group-talk is a mere shorthand to talk about all of its members. The Com-
posite Class was an extreme example of reducibility because we refer to the whole knowing 
full well that this is a mere shorthand for a component-story: the composite of its members. 
When, for instance, we say “these are the exam-answers of the class,” we can replace this with 
“these exam-answers are the composite of the answers of member A, member B,... member 
Z”. As such, the Composite Class is a good example of reducibility. However, it is, as we have 
shown, a bad example of macro-systematicity. So, before we will be able to answer why we 
would ever change the subject from the members to the group, we had better use a different 
case to mark the additional difference; a case where there is reducibility, but also macro-sys-
tematicity. Consider the Summative Class: 
Summative Class: The answers that the class fills in will be those that are agreed 
upon by all or most of the members. 
This example is constructed in the spirit of the Simple Summative Account (a group believes 
that p if and only if all or most of its members believe that p - Gilbert, 2013). For our present 
purposes, let us assume two additional things apply to this class: (i) the members are honest 
and communicative, and (ii) care is taken so that any decided upon group-answer does not 
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suffer from any unseemly4 inconsistency with its other answers. The singular and (mostly) 
coherent voice of the Summative Class will give the epistemic stance explanatory power. But 
employing an epistemic stance towards the group has no benefit over employing an epistemic 
stance towards (the majority of) its members along with the odd consistency-considerations. 
Even though we can detect group-level macro-systematicities, they are dismissible as super-
fluous on the ground that we can easily reduce them to the individual-level systematicities. If 
the purpose of the epistemic stance is to explain or predict, then being able to detect the same 
properties and make the same predictions (with the same or comparable ease) without going 
one level higher would make the employment of the epistemic stance towards the group re-
dundant, save as a shorthand or abbreviation. The Summative Class is the shortest hand I can 
plausibly think of for a group with macro-systematicity. But the hand of group-talk is not 
always that short, and sizes vary. 
 
4. Emergence 
Labelling a set of members as ‘one group’ has the advantage of bypassing the cumbersome 
talk about individual members with the swiftness of talking about all of them at once, either 
as a shorthand or because the power of the epistemic stance is uniquely tied to the group-level. 
Explicating when it is the latter is exactly what is demanded of the second part of our research 
question (RQ’’-ii). I will argue that the epistemic stance employed towards the group is not 
only useful, but explanatorily unique to the group-level when the power of the epistemic stance 
towards the group has no equally powerful counterpart at the member-level, making it irre-
ducible and thus emergent.  
 
4.1. The Longhand of Emergence 
Emergence is a philosophical term that is often invoked, but hard to define. The general char-
acterization is that “emergent entities (properties or substances) ‘arise’ out of more fundamen-
tal entities and yet are ‘novel’ or ‘irreducible’ with respect to them” (O’Connor & Wong, 
2015) so that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. What that ‘more’ means, however, 
is the tricky part. If groups can have ‘novel’ or ‘irreducible’ properties with respect to its 
members, then it is clear why emergence is so important in why we might change our focus 
from members to groups. However, it also puts a lot of stress on what we mean by ‘novel’ or 
‘irreducible.’ If the characteristics of the groups have to be realized by what their members are 
doing, then there is always some kind of story at the lower level that accounts for the macro-
systematicities at a higher one—thus making it reducible it in some way. For authors wielding 
‘emergence’ this has created a palpable tension between either trying to deny a reducibility-
story (to the extent of making ‘irreducible’ indistinguishable from ‘magical’) or overstressing 
the importance of finding one (to the extent that any higher-level explanation, no matter how 
useful or conceptually distinct, would be considered irrelevant if there is also a lower one, no 
 
4 While it is true that human individuals are rarely wildly inconsistent (and would be accused of a divided mind 
if they were), they are not meticulously consistent either. Groups should not be held to a higher standard of 
consistency than individuals.  
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matter how complex). With my own characterization of emergence I aim to acknowledge that 
there is always some relation between the micro and macro, but that the degree of complexity 
in that relation should make a difference in how we conceive of the macro. 
We established that what a person does could be explained or predicted by interpreting her to 
have beliefs, intentions, and rationality. However, her macro-systematicities are primarily re-
alized by neurons, so there must be some elaborate way to talk about beliefs at the neuron 
level. But, of course, it is not the neurons that have those beliefs. Perhaps we may be able to 
reduce a person’s beliefs to a particular belief-area in her brain, but we cannot locate properties 
of wholes in their divided parts, ad infinitum. At some level, the property of the whole will be 
spread across those parts. Furthermore, there is no reason to suppose that patterns at the higher-
level can be explained by any systematic grouping (or function of) lower-level patterns. As far 
as we know, the beliefs of human individuals have no easy mapping-relation to the patterns of 
its neurons or any selection thereof, making the endeavour of talking about them at the neuron-
level as needlessly complicated, unsystematic, and unrewarding as trying to recount the plot 
of a film using the pixel-level. Some properties will only remain conceptually meaningful at a 
suitably level of explanation. It is in this sense, and no stronger metaphysical sense, that the 
epistemic properties of humans are irreducible to neurons or atoms and thus “emergent.” That 
is why I characterize emergence thusly: 
Emergence: An entity has emergent properties at a macro-level if those properties 
have no straightforward mapping-relation to any properties at a level below.  
This focuses on the degree of systematicity between two levels of explanation. If this system-
aticity is high, then we have an easy way to map concepts of the higher-level to those of a 
lower (namely via that mapping-relation), but if it is not, there is no explanatorily powerful 
way to talk about the macro-systematicities at the micro-level (because there is no straightfor-
ward way to map one onto the other). In short, if reducibility was a shorthand, then emergence 
is a longhand.  
The difference between an emergent and reducible epistemic agent is thus not an operational 
or functional difference, but a difference of explanatory benefit. We can have two functionally 
equivalent groups, one which requires an epistemic stance towards the whole (e.g., Expert 
Planet) and another which does not (e.g., Summative Class). In the latter, the abilities of the 
group can be systematically pinpointed as abilities of the members. And although an epistemic 
stance referencing beliefs, aims and tactics may be useful, we can systematically pinpoint how 
the group’s members (and their interaction) feature in this story without losing the conceptual 
story involving beliefs, aims and tactics. In short, there is a straightforward (and thus explan-
atorily powerful) way to map one onto the other. In the most straightforward relation, there is 
a one-on-one correspondence between the group-property and member-properties. Chunking 
the members into a group saves some labor, but nothing changes conceptually.5 In the Expert 
Planet, however, there is no one-on-one correspondence, nor is there any straightforward way 
to map those group-concepts on the member-level (any more than there is a way to map indi-
vidual beliefs to neurons), so the macro-systematicities we detect at the macro-level are con-
ceptually tied to that level. As such, if we want to benefit from the epistemic stance’s 
 
5 Rather like the relation between machine language and assembly language. (Hofstadter, 1999, p. 290-291) 
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explanatory power, we can do so only by focusing on the group as a whole. The members 
simply are not, in any straightforward way, involved in producing the answers on the exam. 
What the beliefs of the members are with regard to the exam-answers does not (directly) mat-
ter. It may indirectly matter in that they might not perform the role of their respective neuron 
if their opinions or beliefs were otherwise, but it is still in the role of a neuron that they con-
tribute to the larger whole, not as an epistemic agent with their beliefs taken into consideration. 
Because the China Brain (and thus The Expert Planet) is so unlikely, List and Pettit (2011) 
decided it best to restrict the conceptualization of group agents to groups of which the attitudes 
bear some relation to the member attitudes. It bears noting that such a restriction does not only 
exclude the unlikely cases (like the Expert Planet) from our conceptual scope, but any situation 
where even one macro-systematicity is more reliant on the actions of the members indirectly 
(e.g., through self-organization) than the attitudes of the members directly. Therefore, I do not 
subscribe to this restriction. 
The aforementioned characterization fits with all three of aspects of emergence discussed by 
Theiner (& O’Connor, 2010; Theiner, 2017), namely (a) organizational-dependence, (b) nov-
elty, and (c) autonomy. It is (a) organizational-dependent, because only when the group-prop-
erties depend on the organization of the members (and not just on an aggregation of their 
properties), can there be a failure of straightforwardly mapping group-properties onto mem-
ber-properties. The group level has (b) novelty, because if an emergent property is conceptu-
ally tied to the higher level, it is new with regard to the previous one. Furthermore, this entails 
that the group level consequences are not due to the intentions of the members, because if they 
are, there is a mapping-relation which involves whatever plan the members have to achieve 
these group level consequences.6 Lastly, the group-level is (c) autonomous because it is the 
product of one epistemic stance, detached from the epistemic stances we employ towards its 
members (since the epistemic stance makes no dictates on implementation). This entails that 
the group-properties could be multiply realizable. I here depart from Tollefsen (2002), who 
focuses mainly on (c) multiple realizability to argue for changing the subject, whereas my 
account, although it entails multiple realizability (otherwise there would be a systematic way 
to map every macro-systematicity to the lower level), it is still possible that a multiply realiz-
able macro-systematicity has a straightforward mapping relation in each case (e.g., when dif-
ferent sets of members underlie the group-belief), denying the explanatory power as being 
unique to the macro-level. 
In sum, an individual has emergent epistemic properties if those properties cannot straightfor-
wardly be mapped to any properties at the neuron/atom level so that we could talk about those 
properties via neurons. A group has emergent epistemic properties (is explanatorily unique) if 
the stance adopted towards the group has no direct mapping-relation, no shorthand, to any of 
the stances we would adopt towards its members. There is a difference between using ‘group’ 
as shorthand or abbreviation for member-systematicities and using ‘group’ because member-
systematicities are conceptually far removed from the group-systematicities. One may still 
object to group-talk (as more than a shorthand) by saying that one’s interests begin and end 
 
6 They may recognize those consequences and be consistently happy with them—which is one way that the 
members continuing to play their part can be ensured—but that is different from those consequences having 
been their intention all along. 
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with human individuals (i.e., members), as opposed to any macro-entity (i.e., the group as 
group). This is fair enough, as long as one also forgoes talking about the useful macro-system-
aticities that belong to the group (and not the member) level. 
 
4.2. Degrees & Dimensions of Reducibility 
If emergence has to do with how straightforward the mapping-relation is between the micro 
and macro, then this suggests that there are degrees to emergence. Furthermore, mapping re-
lations can come in various kinds. I believe exploring these degrees and dimensions of reduc-
ibility to be a valuable avenue for epistemologists. Summative accounts get contrasted with 
non-summative ones and critics have attacked non-summative accounts for the way in which 
their group-story could be reduced to a member-story. (Goldman & Blanchard, 2018) It seems 
readily acknowledged that such criticisms do not necessarily close the conceptual possibility 
for group-talk altogether, but why it does not is not clear. If emergence is a key motivator in 
considering a group as a group rather than as a shorthand for its members, then explicating the 
manner and degree of emergence would go a long way to explain why certain non-summative 
groups are worthy of their epistemic stance and others are not. With that in mind, I would like 
to offer up two dimensions (and some degrees within them) that I believe to be at play: (i) 
selective reductionism, and (ii) transformative reductionism. 
The first dimension, (i) selective reductionism, deals with the process that determines which 
member-property a group-property could reduce to. Here we are starting from the assumption 
that a group-property can be located in one (or several) of the members and that there is either 
an explicit or implicit selection procedure that determines which particular or aggregate of 
member-properties is to stand for the group. There can be varying degrees of complexity to 
this procedure. The most straightforward selection-procedure would be if there were only one 
operative member. In such cases, the group-view is just a shorthand to say ‘that particular 
member’. A case like the Summative Class (or any kind of majority vote) is not far ahead in 
that it simply selects for the group property that property which is present in the majority or 
all of its members, along with a consistency requirement. More complex still is when there is 
an implicit or explicit rule for who is operative in which situation (e.g., let member A answer 
all the theoretical questions, let B make all the exercises, let C formulate all the reflective 
questions, and so forth). A little further on, we might find a group where the distribution of 
properties has extra determining factors in dividing the labour, meaning it has further proce-
dures (explicit or implicit) to decide which property may reduce to which member in which 
circumstances. We can take this further still and divide each property in sub-components (or 
sub-tasks) and distribute these among the members. What we can see here is an increasing 
reliance of the properties of the group on the procedures for selecting them. The more com-
plexity there is to that procedure, the more what characterizes the group is relegated towards 
the procedure (however that procedure is implemented, be it by rules or by organic dynamics) 
rather than to the members directly, and the less benefit we would get from reducing the group 
to its members. Furthermore, in group dynamics, that process of selection could be borne of 
the interaction between members, which may not admit of any systematic procedure-descrip-
tion to specify a clear mapping-relation. 
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To make this more intuitive, consider an analogy with composing a text. If I copy-paste Hamlet 
and publish it, Shakespeare is the author of the text, not I. If I compose an Anthology by 
selecting several texts that make a coherent whole, then an editor credit is certainly called for, 
but it is still clear that the authorship belongs largely to those whom I selected the texts from. 
If I manage to create a coherent whole by using every other sentence from different existing 
texts, then there may be a way to reduce every single sentence to its original author, but it is 
my ingenious selection-process that lies behind the character of the novel as a whole - this 
despite the fact that I can reduce each sentence in the text to a specific author.  
The second dimension, (ii) transformative reductionism, deals with the process that determines 
how a group-property (or display of ability) could be mapped onto a property of a different 
kind in its members. The smallest amount of transformation is of course no transformation at 
all, when group properties reduce directly to the same member-properties, as was presupposed 
in all cases of selective reductionism. The beliefs of the group are provided by the beliefs of 
the members, the aims of the groups by the aims of the members and so on. A slightly more 
transformative relation is one where group-properties do not reduce to the same member-pro-
perties, but very similar ones nonetheless. An example of this is beliefs of the group reducing 
to the commitments of (the majority of) their members. As Gilbert (2013) has pointed out, 
members can (jointly) commit to something they don’t believe, in which case the group can 
be said to believe something that none of its members do. But is this sufficient for an emergent 
property? In a weak sense, yes, but there is still only a short distance to cross in explaining the 
group-level story with a member-level story: namely, the commitments of each of the members 
to act in a way that reflects that belief along with their expressed readiness to do so (on pain 
of rebuke) due to the commitment. (Gilbert, 2013) The fact that Gilbert is able to convey what 
constitutes a group belief in such individualistic terms betrays the ease with which we can map 
the group properties to a set of individual properties. Although group properties are a useful 
shorthand and help not to conflate which properties function as those of the group with those 
of the members, we can still map one onto a set of the other. The case of the Averaging group 
(the group-belief is the average of the member’s beliefs) is another example of a short distance 
between the member- and group-story. Taking the average of member-beliefs can result in a 
‘novel’ belief not attributable to any of the members (e.g., when asked for the solution of 3+2, 
if A answers 4 and B answers 6, then the group settles on 5), but behind its novelty is a trans-
formation-relation that is too small to feel the need to change the subject. We can still easily 
use group-talk as a shorthand for what the members believe—by considering it as an average 
of the member-answers. The more complexity we add to that procedure, the more what char-
acterizes the group is relegated towards the procedure rather than the members and the more 
difficult to talk about the macro-systematicity in groups via those of its members. Furthermore, 
if the procedure is due to continuous interaction between members, it may not admit of any 
systematic procedure-description to specify a clear mapping-relation. 
The same authoring text metaphor can be used here. If I copy-paste Hamlet and print it, I am 
not the author of the text. Nor would I be if I added a small transformation to each word (e.g., 
changing the font). Translating the text into another language would earn me a Translator 
credit, but it would not fundamentally change the author of the text. An adaptation, on the 
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other hand, would start doing that (and move Shakespeare into a less glamorous credit of “In-
spired by the work of”). The more the work gets transformed, the more credit goes to whatever 
transformation-process was involved.  
In both dimensions, what creates the emergence is the increasing complexity in the mapping-
relation. In selective reductionism, it is the way in which it is decided which member-property 
will operate as the group property. In transformative reductionism, it is the way in which mem-
ber-properties are molded to operate for the group property. These dimensions intermingle 
quite a bit. Much like the two extremes earlier, I think the extremes along these dimensions 
are interesting because they are conceptually clearer, but I would be quite surprised to, for 
instance, see a group with no transformation-relations, but a high selection-relation for similar 
reasons that I would be surprised to see texts composed of other people’s sentences.7 Addi-
tionally, nothing stands in the way of the various group-properties having different kinds of 
relations to its member-properties.  
 
Conclusion 
Could groups, collectively, understand? We have elucidated what that question means by first 
specifying what it means for an entity to understand, namely: possessing the appropriate abili-
ties. Groups can certainly display the relevant abilities, but this does not automatically entail 
that groups, rather than their members, understand anything. Labelling a set of members as 
‘one group’ has the advantage of bypassing the need to cumbersomely talk about individual 
members with the swiftness of talking about all of them at once. But is group-talk ever more 
than just a shorthand or a metaphor? Conversely, is epistemic agenthood ever something that 
could or should be attributed to a group (as opposed to its members)? To answer this, we have 
explicated what it means to be an epistemic agent: being a successful target of the epistemic 
stance. The epistemic stance creates an instrumental abstraction by attributing epistemic prop-
erties (i.e., beliefs, epistemic aims, problem-solving tactics) to an entity to explain or predict 
its behaviour. The explanatory or predictive power of the stance is what validates any entity 
(such as a group) as an epistemic agent. Macro-systematicity (a higher level pattern which a 
theory can exploit) is what makes the epistemic stance’s abstraction explanatory powerful (re-
gardless of how that macro-systematicity is realized) and emergence (the lack of a straightfor-
ward relation between the micro and the macro) is what makes the power of the epistemic 
stance unique to a particular level of explanation (because the relation between macro and the 
micro is so complex that the concepts at one level are no longer appropriate to describe the 
other). But there are different degrees and dimensions to this relation (two were suggested in 
this paper: the complexity in the selection and transformation procedure) and these require 
further development. While I have not answered whether there do exist good candidates of 
group epistemic agents, I hope to have shed light on the conceptual space involved in substan-
tiating such an answer.  
 
 
7 Except as an exercise precisely with this methodology in mind. 
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